Editor’s Note:
Regular readers are aware that we don’t use the word Pak-i-Stan. We all
remember what happened when a regime called itself & its land as
the Master Race. Soon they came up with “Lebensraum” and the rest
is history. No one of European descent ever calls that regime by its
given name Third Reich. The word Pak-i-Stan is even more heinous than
the Master Race concept. Because it means the land/regime of Pak or Pure
people. So by definition the regime cannot allow itself to be
impurified by people like Hindus, Ahmediya Muslims or now Shia Muslims.
Yet, American & European keep using that given name Pakistan. We
will not. So we correct it by add the neutral “non” and calling it NonPak-i-Stan. Note we don’t use NaaPak which is a negative or insulting term.
When the world was waiting with bated breath to see whether North Korea’s Kim Jong Un would test a missile, we wrote an article titled Is North Korea China’s Pakistan? Will It Become America’s Nightmare?
This week we read an article by Professor Joseph Nye that essentially makes similar points without mentioning the NonPak analogy. We are humble students of the Global Macro art. We can be broad & daring in our thinking. Joseph Nye, on the other hand, is not merely a Harvard professor. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council. His article is about the discussion of North Korea during last month’s summit between President Barack Obama & President Xi Jin Ping. That discussion and that forum precludes any reference to highly sensitive issues like North Korea becoming China’s NonPak-i-Stan.
Nye titled his article North Korea’s Powerful Weakness. He explains:
- “North Korea has what I call “the power of weakness.” In certain bargaining situations, weakness and the threat of collapse can be a source of power. To take a well-known example, if you owe a bank $1,000, the bank has power over you; but if you owe the bank $1 billion, you may have considerable bargaining power over the bank. China is, in this sense, North Korea’s over-exposed banker.”
Frankly, that is a weak analogy. We used a different analogy in April 2013:
- The NonPakistan strategy was once described simply as “we will blow ourselves up if you don’t help us“. It has worked very well for them. Why wouldn’t it work well for North Korea as well?
- The world is even
more eager to ensure the survival of the NonPakistani regime because no
one wants to even contemplate the aftermath of a collapse in NonPakistan.
Or as Nye might put it, NonPak-iStan (or “NPak” for short) has a much greater power of weakness than North Korea (or “NKorea” for short). So, as we argued in our April 2013 article, isn’t it logical to expect NKorea to emulate what NPak has accomplished?
How does Nye describe the Chinese decision to support NKorea?
- “China was sincere in expressing its desire for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, but the nuclear issue was not its primary concern. It also sought to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and the resulting potential for chaos on its border – not only flows of refugees, but also the possibility that South Korean or US troops could move into the North.”
- “Torn between its two objectives, China placed a higher priority on preserving the Kim family dynasty. That choice gave rise to a seeming paradox: North Korea gained surprisingly powerful influence over China.”
- As a Chinese official once told me in an unguarded moment, “North Korea has hijacked our foreign policy.”
Isn’t this virtually identical to America & NPak? NPak has such a powerful influence, some would say stranglehold, over American policy that America remains unable to build a sustainable partnership with India.
Nye writes further:
- “North Korea has amplified its power by playing its weak hand audaciously. The North’s leaders know that superior South Korean and US military forces would win a full-scale military conflict. And yet, with 15,000 artillery tubes in the Demilitarized Zone, just 30 miles (48 kilometers) north of Seoul, the South Korean capital, they also know that they could wreak havoc on South Korea’s economy, whereas the North has relatively less to lose.”
- “North Korea has long been adept at flaunting its willingness to take risks, provoking a crisis in 2010 by sinking a South Korean naval vessel and shelling a South Korean island. This spring, it conducted a nuclear test and a series of missile tests, accompanied by a stream of bellicose rhetoric.”
Frankly, NKorea is a baby compared to NPak when it comes to flaunting willingness to take risks and playing a weak hand audaciously. NPak openly and contemptuously trains, funds and supports terrorists and infiltrates them into India. The terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008 is only the most visible tip of that iceberg. Forget India. NPak has semi-openly funneled American funds to the Taliban who used the monies to fight American troops in Afghanistan. America knows this but can’t & doesn’t want to do anything about it. Talk about an extreme power of weakness.
This is why we asked in April 2013:
- “So why would any American strategist expect China to rein in North Korea when America hasn’t taken any serious step to rein in NonPakistan”
To answer our own question – there is one big difference between the America-NPak relationship and China-NKorea relationship.
- America has very little direct risk to its homeland from a collapse in NPak.
- No weapon in the NPak military can come anywhere close to American homeland. NPak military knows that developing such a missile will not only invite a preemptive response but also end up terminating all relations & funding.
- American mainland is separated from NPak by oceans and continents. Even a complete exodus from NPak will not touch America’s shores.
- China is at direct extreme risk from a collapse in NKorea.
- China is a neighboring state and its prosperous areas are within easy reach of a NKorean nuclear missile. That is an extreme scenario but one that must be considered. This explains why China really wants a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
- Secondly China is at least a secondary target for a mass exodus from NKorea, the first of course being South Korea.
This may be why Nye writes about a possible change in China’ posture:
- “The signs of a change are intriguing. Following the “frank” discussion of North Korea by Xi and Obama, Xi hosted a summit with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, without first meeting with its official North Korean ally. Instead, two senior North Korean officials subsequently visited Beijing and were scolded for the North’s behavior.”
We are doubtful. Because as Nye himself writes:
- North Korea has tempered its rhetoric and behavior, but the Kim regime has given no indication that it is willing to give up the nuclear-weapons program that it regards as vital to its security and prestige. In the long run, economic and social change may help to resolve the situation. China’s dilemma remains that if it pushes too fast for reform, the Kim regime may collapse.
This used to be America’s dilemma with NPak. They solved it by the Rumsfeld dictum – “they made the problem bigger, much bigger”. How? By building the 4th largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world in the past 5 years. Now no one even thinks about asking them to give up their nuclear weapons program.
Will NKorea attempt to build up their own nuclear weapons arsenal the way NPak did? And will NPak military help them?
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